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1 Introduction 
In 2017, The Economist headlined, "The world's most valuable resource is no longer oil, 
but data" (The Economist, 2017). Data are not only increasing in value but also affect our lives in 
the most profound ways  from guiding our love life (Rajan, 2019) to dictating the value of 
each citizen in China's Social Credit System (Liang et al., 2018). The field of data ethics seeks to 
investigate the social implications and moral problems related to data and data technologies 
(Floridi & Taddeo, 2016). While this discourse is of critical importance, we argue that it is 
missing one fundamental point: If more and more efforts in business, government, science, and 
our daily lives are data-driven, we should pay more attention to what exactly we are driven by. 
To this end, we need more debate on what fundamental properties constitute data.  
In its everyday use, the term "data" is of considerable variability, depending on the domain and 
situation. Therefore, we face the question of which concept of data might be most fruitful for the 
debate on data ethics. Data ethics has developed into a broad area of research that not only asks 
questions about data, its generation, storage, or dissemination but also investigates the uses of 
data, for instance, in the form of algorithms (Floridi & Taddeo, 2016; Mittelstadt et al., 2016). 
More fashionable terminology, such as artificial intelligence or data science, might obscure the 
fact that especially when looking at the applications of data, these practices often fall within the 
realm of statistics. Therefore, we argue that in these cases, data ethics can, to some degree, be 
understood as an ethics of statistics. At least to the same extent, we can identify the conception 
of data at play, as one of statistical data.  
In the first section of the paper, we work from the fundamental properties necessary for statistical 
computation to a definition of statistical data. We define a statistical datum as the coming 
together of substantive and numerical properties and differentiate between qualitative and 
quantitative data.1 Subsequently, we qualify our definition by arguing that for data to be 
practically useful, it needs to be commensurable in a manner that reveals meaningful differences 
that allow for the generation of relevant insights through statistical methodologies. 
In the second section, we focus on what our conception of data can contribute to the 
discourse on data ethics and beyond. First, we hold that the need for useful data to be 
commensurable rules out an understanding of substantive properties as fundamentally unique or 
fundamentally equal. Instead, useful data must be defined at a level of generality between the 
two extremes. Second, we argue that practical concerns lead us to increasingly standardize how 
we operationalize a substantive property; in other words, how we formalize the relationship 
between the substantive and numerical properties of data. Thereby, we also standardize the 
interpretation of a property. With our increasing reliance on data and data technologies, these 
two characteristics of data affect our collective conception of reality. Statistical data's exclusion 
of the fundamentally unique and equal influences our perspective on the world, and the 
standardization of substantive properties can be viewed as profound ontological practice, 
entrenching ever more pervasive interpretations of phenomena in our everyday lives. 
 
 
 
1For the remainder of this paper, we will generally refrain from repeating the qualifier “statistical,” and instead refer 
to data. 
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2 Ontology of Data 
2.1 Existing Definitions of Data 
Before we define data within the field of statistics, we will outline existing conceptions of 
data in philosophy. These approaches to understanding data are more general and might prove 
more valuable for equally general matters or instances where data are not statistical. Presumably, 
the most fundamental approach to a definition of data can be found in Floridi (2011), where data 
are understood as the raw material of information. In his philosophy of information, "a datum is 
ultimately reducible to a lack of uniformity." A datum is "x being distinct from y," where x and y 
remain uninterpreted (Floridi, 2011, p. 85). If data are well-formatted (syntax), meaningful 
(semantics), and truthful, they become information (Floridi, 2011b, p. 104). One might question 
whether this definition aligns with the meaning of the term "data" in everyday language or within 
statistics. Instead, it might be considered an ontological argument about the nature of reality and 
information.  
 Within the philosophy of science, Leonelli (2016) distinguishes between representational 
and relational accounts of data. A representational account puts forth a context-independent 
underlying definition of data. One example of a representational interpretation is the definition 
proposed by the Royal Society (2012, p. 12) of data as "numbers, characters or images that 
designate an attribute of a phenomenon." It is closely related to notions of data as "raw" 
materials of research and a realist view on measurement. Leonelli (2015) herself advocates for a 
relational view on data, arguing that what is considered data is context-dependent. More 
precisely, whether something constitutes data is contingent on the use case as long as it is 
portable and potentially useful as evidence. 
The primary purpose of this article is not to define data in general or within science as a whole, 
but to give a definition of data within statistics and to illustrate how this can help ground social 
and ethical issues specific to data of such kind. Nonetheless, we view our work in support of the 
thesis that what we regard as data depends on the context. By limiting ourselves to statistical 
data, we are effectively providing such a context in the form of the standards and methodologies 
that limit what we can use as evidence within statistics. Consequently, our definition might not 
be entirely applicable to other areas of science. While we believe that further research 
contrasting notions of data between disciplines could provide meaningful insights into the field's 
epistemology and scope, we limit our analysis to the field of statistics. 
2.2 Defining data 
We shall briefly outline some definitions of statistics itself before seeking one of 
statistical data. Savage (1977), for instance, defines statistics as the study of uncertainty. Others 
define statistics as "the practice of gathering data and making inferences based on them" 
(Bandyopadhyay & Forster, 2011, p. 1). Agresti and Franklin (2009, p. 4) also identify statistics 
as "the art and science of learning from data." As we lack a precise understanding of statistical 
data, such proposals leave open the substantive question of what exactly we are learning from. If 
we concede that those data-based definitions of statistics carry some truth, we can see how 
crucial an investigation into the nature of statistical data can be to better understand the 
epistemology of statistics, as well as its social and ethical implications.  
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By looking at various definitions of statistics, it becomes evident that we can approach 
statistics from different angles, as well as understand its domain more or less broadly. Statistics 
might include elements such as observation, information collection, preprocessing, computation, 
visualization, and interpretation (Freund & Miller, 1965). These different processes depend on 
different kinds and representations of information. The information gained at the point of 
observation, for instance, can be vastly different from the information before computation in 
both meaning and representation. If we want to define data as the informational material of 
statistical analysis, we face the question of where to locate statistical data. 
For our purposes, we identify data as information that can serve as the input for statistical 
calculation. We have three main reasons for doing so. First, we want statistical data to be 
sufficiently distinct from information in general so that our definition is relevant for questions 
specific to statistics. While almost all information can be collected, processed, visualized, or 
interpreted, the information admissible for calculation is of a specific format. Second, while the 
gathering and processing of information can make up significant parts of a statistician's work, a 
statistician does not collect or process data as an end in itself. He or she does so to enable 
insights, even if these acts are temporally distant or carried out by different individuals. These 
insights are most often gained through visualization or computation. Lastly, our definition of 
data should give us relevant insights on social and ethical issues. We believe that inferences and 
ultimately actions, based on statistical computation, including machine learning and other data 
technologies, are of considerable social and moral significance. All these factors lead us to 
pinpoint data as the information that is admissible for statistical computation. Locating data at 
this place does not imply that only information immediately before computation is considered 
data, but that everything we consider to be data would be directly admissible for such 
calculation. The information found at other stages of a statistician's work might equally qualify 
as data, if admissible for calculation. In other cases, we might understand it as a predecessor of 
data. Readers objecting to our focus on statistical computation may qualify our definition as not 
about statistical data, but data for statistical computation. 
To arrive at our definition of a datum, we must look at the most fundamental properties 
that enable statistical calculation. Calculation is numerical. It follows that data must have 
numerical properties to be admissible for calculation. However, these numerical properties are 
not merely abstract numbers. To allow for representation or insights into more than the nature 
and relationship of numbers, statistical data must have substantive properties. The numbers must 
represent a substance, whether this substance is known ex-ante or still unidentified. These 
substantive properties are what allows for data's "prospective usefulness as evidence" (Leonelli, 
2015, p. 2) or "designate an attribute of a phenomenon" (Royal Society, 2012, p. 12).  We 
conclude that for data to be admissible for statistical computation, it needs to have numerical and 
substantive properties. Consequently, we arrive at our definition of a statistical datum: 
A statistical datum is a numerical property representing a substantive property of a specific 
object.  
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2.3 Types of Data 
Qualitative Data 
Recall that we identified data as the kind of information that one can immediately apply 
in statistical computation. There, it becomes the value of a variable. These variables can be 
qualitative (also: categorical) or quantitative. For this reason, we can also distinguish between 
qualitative and quantitative data. The categories of qualitative data are qualitative substantive 
properties that we can assign to objects. At times, we represent these categories by numbers that 
function as labels. These labels are, as Espeland and Stevens (2008, p. 407) note, "numbers that 
mark." Such labels can be arbitrary and do not need to be numerical at all. A letter or other 
symbol can equally function as a label. Therefore, they should not be confused with the 
numerical properties of data that enable statistical computation. To identify the numerical 
properties of qualitative data, let us imagine a simple dataset on two students' athletic activities. 
Joe swims and cheers, while Jessica plays soccer.  The numerical property of the individual 
datum is the binary numerical answer to the question, "Does object x have property y? ". In our 
case, we could ask, "Does Joe play Basketball?". By its numerical property, qualitative data 
records the presence (1) or absence (0) of such a qualitative property. 
 
Table 1 
Qualitative Data on High-School Athletes 
 Basketball Swimming Cheerleading Soccer 
Joe 0 1 1 0 
Jessica 0 0 0 1 
 
Table 2 
Numerical Value and Substantive Property 
 Plays Basketball (Substantive Property) 
Joe (Object) 0 (Numerical Property) 
 
Quantitative Data 
While qualitative data only identifies the presence or absence of a property, the 
substantive properties of quantitative data allow for comparison by degree. It is not by having 
numerical properties that quantitative data gets its name, as both quantitative and qualitative data 
have numerical properties. Instead, the qualifier "quantitative" refers to the substantive property 
of the datum. With quantitative data, we can now compare the property by degree. For instance, 
we can say not only whether Jessica plays soccer or not (qualitative), but how many goals she 
shot in comparison to her teammates (quantitative). Moreover, the numerical properties of 
quantitative data can also include ranges or distributions of numbers.  
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2.4 Contouring Data 
Our definition of a datum as a numerical property representing a substantive property of a 
specific object is  very close to the one put forth by the Royal Society (2012, p. 12), which 
defined data as "numbers, characters or images that designate an attribute of a phenomenon." 
Together they paint an image of statistical data as a specific case of scientific data. However, it is 
also not in contradiction with the definition put forth by Leonelli (2015). When data were to be 
context-dependent, wouldn't it permit differentiating data in diverse contexts? Within a relational 
conception of data, our definition presents a context-specific subtype of data. Still, the question 
remains, how data are distinct from information.  
It is evident that not every information immediately also constitutes data. This text, as an 
example of linguistic information, does not have explicit numerical properties. It is also correct 
that even if not explicitly represented, we can easily find numerical properties, such as the 
number of words. However, the question we are facing is whether all information can be 
translated into data, which would make data merely a specific representation (syntax) or whether 
only specific information can be translated into data, rendering data specific in meaning 
(semantics). To answer this question, we would have to analyze it in light of different 
conceptions of information. We acknowledge the need for further research into this issue. At the 
same time, we wish to move from rather theoretic to more practical considerations in order to 
illustrate how an explicit analysis of the properties of data can be of value for social and ethical 
debates.  
 
2.5 The Need for Commensurability 
Up until now, we based our analysis on the essential properties of data. What we 
described so far is the bare minimum, theoretically, enabling something to be used as a statistical 
datum. We paid no attention to the question of whether the data is meaningful or suitable. Now, 
we will turn our heads to the property that makes data practically useful. Statistical calculation is 
numerical. As Jevons (1874, p. 177) notes, a number "consists in abstracting the character of the 
difference from which plurality arises, retaining merely the fact." Consequently, by being about 
numbers, statistics is about differences. More precisely, it is the study of how differences and 
equalities of one kind, abstracted as numbers, relate to differences of another kind, usually 
differences in probability. When calculating, we extract the numerical properties from the data, 
retaining only the relationships of difference or equality that are the numbers and (quite literally) 
the units. Statistical computation is a fundamentally relational practice, not concerned with the 
substantive properties themselves but only with their numerical relationships. Therefore, we 
must understand the usefulness of data in equally relational terms. A datum is not useful in and 
of itself but relative to the other data available and the task at hand. A single datum is only useful 
for statistics if commensurable in a manner that reveals differences (relative to other data) that 
allow for the generation of relevant insights (relative to the use case) through statistical 
methodologies: 
Useful statistical data are numerical properties representing substantive properties of specific 
objects that are commensurable in a manner that reveals meaningful differences that allow for 
the generation of relevant insights through statistical methodologies. 
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By now, we defined statistical datum, differentiated between qualitative and quantitative 
data, and identified that for data to be useful, it needs to be commensurable in a way that reveals 
meaningful differences. This need for data to be commensurable in order to be useful can help us 
ground at least two issues of social and ethical significance.  
3 Ethics of Data 
3.1 Data, the unique, and the equal 
Let us start with an example illustrating how the level of generality with which we 
consider a substantive property influences the usefulness of data. People might have very distinct 
and complex mental abilities that we label intelligence. Goethe might have been able to capture 
his readers with his exceptional linguistic abilities, while Beethoven's unique musical genius 
overshadows his more questionable social intelligence. In the same fashion, all people have very 
individual combinations of highly specific abilities that we associate with intelligence. When 
seeking data for statistical computation, however, we would hardly identify each of these sets of 
abilities at a level of detail where it applies to only one person. It would also make little sense to 
define intelligence so that it applies to all of them in totally equal terms. Instead, we would seek 
categories that allow for relevant groupings, such as "musically talented" or "analytically gifted" 
(qualitative) or general properties that apply to all of them in varying degrees, such as the IQ 
score (quantitative). 
As previously defined, useful statistical data entails defining the substantive properties in 
a manner that reveals meaningful differences, allowing for the generation of insights through 
statistical methodologies. But what exactly does it mean to define the substantive properties in 
such a fashion? First, our example illustrates that it is of little use to view the substantive 
properties at a level of specificity at which the property only applies to a single object, such as a 
holistic and very detailed view on an individual's intelligence. Remember that when calculating 
with the numerical properties of the data, we discount the substantive property itself, retaining 
merely the relationships of difference and equality. When we define a property as unique to a 
single object, all that one can statistically infer is that the object is distinct from all other objects. 
The value of this insight is, at best, limited. The fact that an object is distinct is self-evident, and 
no further substantive property defined in such a fashion adds any benefit to statistical 
computation. The same applies to properties so general and broad that they apply to all of them 
to the same degree. If all objects are equal with respect to that property, we have no difference 
that we could base our statistical computation upon. We can see that there is an ideal level of 
generality that is neither too detailed to the point where something is unique nor too general, 
where no differentiation is possible. Where we define a property on this spectrum between 
generality and specificity is subject to the application, epistemic access, and statistical 
methodology. However, what we can say about statistical data, in general, is that they are not 
useful when defined at the extremes of total uniqueness and total equality.  
 
7 
 
Totally unique 
? 
Figure 1 
Usefulness of data as a function of generality 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Data and ontological standardization 
We illustrated how the need for statistical data to be commensurable rules out the two 
extreme understandings of phenomena as fundamentally unique or fundamentally equal. 
Between these two extremes lies the space where useful statistical data are possible. As 
mentioned, where precisely we define a property on this spectrum between generality and 
specificity is subject to the application and methodology. However, we will now illustrate that 
practical considerations arising from the need for commensurability, often lead us to standardize 
our understanding of a property.  
Let us introduce another, more empirical example that will help us better understand this 
second consequence of data's need for commensurability. The Binet-Simons Intelligence Scale, 
later revised as the Stanford-Binet Scale, is the origin of the intelligence quotient (IQ) as we 
know it today and profoundly influenced our conception of intelligence. As Carson  (2007, p. 
159) notes, "out of a variety of different ways of conceptualizing intelligence in play at the 
beginning of the century, one dominant theme had emerged. Intelligence was understood as a 
differential, quantifiable, unilinear entity that determined an individual's or group's overall 
mental power." The IQ score is to this day quasi-synonymous with intelligence, standardizing 
our interpretation of it. Furthermore, it is an example of information in the format of statistical 
data. The IQ score is a number (numerical property) representing the intelligence (substantive 
property) of an individual or group (object), rendering the concept of intelligence 
commensurable in a manner that allows for meaningful statistical analysis.  
The Binet-Simons Intelligence Scale also illustrates how we can interpret the generation 
of data as ontological practice. The IQ score seeks to measure intelligence as a substantive 
property. However, as noted by Carson (2007), intelligence is a concept that we can understand 
in many diverse ways. By defining a way of measuring it, it formalizes the relationship between 
the numerical and substantive properties of the datum. In other words, the IQ score formalizes 
how to put a number (numerical property) on intelligence (substantive property) and, thereby, 
Level of generality 
Usefulness of data 
Totally equal 
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defines what counts as intelligence. This interpretation, in turn, becomes the operational 
definition of the concept at the basis of statistical data and inferences made based on them. In 
this manner, we can understand the generation of data as ontological practice. It similarly applies 
to qualitative data in the form of the rules and procedures for assessing whether an object does or 
does not belong (numerical property) to a specific category (substantive property).  
The critical issue we face here is not the fact that we interpret a substantive property in 
one way or the other. Instead, we are concerned with the fact that practical concerns for 
commensurability incentivize us to standardize such interpretation. There is much truth in the 
saying that one cannot compare apples to oranges. If we were to have a multitude of different 
metrics, and, therefore, interpretations of a property, we would face the problem that the data 
might not be commensurable. Through having one standard interpretation, we can most easily 
make use of the most data available. For this practical and economic reason, we often seek to 
standardize our measurement practice and, thus, our conception of phenomena.  
 
3.3 Datafication and our conception of the world 
As outlined, two consequences arise from data's need for commensurability. First, useful 
data must be defined at a level of generality that excludes the interpretation of phenomena as 
fundamentally unique or equal. Second, practical concerns for commensurability incentivize us 
to standardize our interpretation of substantive properties. What makes these facts of social and 
ethical relevance is the increasing proliferation of data and data technologies, also called 
datafication (Cukier & Mayer-Schoenberger, 2019). The need for discussion of these 
characteristics of statistical data in a social and ethical context arises from the ever-increasing 
proliferation of statistical data in our everyday life and the implicit influence it has on our 
understanding of reality. Statistical data are increasingly at the core of systems we inhabit, at the 
core of the decisions we make, at the core of our scientific knowledge, and, ultimately, at the 
core of our everyday experience of the world. With this growing importance of data in our lives, 
the characteristics of statistical data have the potential to alter our interpretation of ourselves and 
the world around us.  
Useful statistical data omits the unique and equal. Our increasing reliance on statistical 
data might also lead us to lose sight of the unique and fundamentally equal in our social and 
individual conception of the world. Not because we explicitly choose to do so but because we 
increasingly inhabit systems and domains of knowledge that are data-driven. Therefore, we are 
inclined to understand the world around us in a manner that aligns with the interpretation of 
substantive properties essential to useful statistical data: an understanding of objects as defined 
by shared properties and their belonging to general categories. Moreover, it is crucial to keep in 
mind that when we define the substantive properties of data at a certain level of generality, 
information about all more specific differences is lost. That means that in all places where data 
dominates our understanding, the qualitative information that renders something unique is lost. 
This subtle change in our conception of the world brought about by datafication deserves our 
attention.  
Arguably more tangible is the standardization of our understanding of substantive 
properties. A shared metric enables us to effectively commensurate data from different sources. 
Especially since we often use secondary data, concerns for commensurability with exiting data 
play an important role in statistical work and incentivize us to standardize our interpretations. 
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This standardization, however, comes at the expense of the plurality of conceptions and must be 
critically reviewed for its cultural implications and power structures involved. The growing reach 
of this homogenization of interpretations does not stop with data. With the proliferation of data 
technologies, the desire for standardization of interpretations in data will implicitly and explicitly 
standardize the conceptualization of phenomena in our daily experience. The decisiveness and 
social relevance of this dynamic can hardly be overstated. Again, we see how the need for 
commensurability plays a crucial role in the way data can shape our understanding of the world 
around us. 
Commensurability and ensuing issues of generality and standardization are not 
necessarily novel, but tendencies existent in science in general. Nevertheless, they are hardly as 
definitive as with statistical data and as expansive as with the current datafication, profoundly 
transforming science, industry, government, and the general society. They are also more complex 
than we could analyze here. Not only do they interrelate with each other, but they are also neither 
strictly good nor bad. A perspective more focused on shared and distinct features might have 
integrative tendencies and allow for insights otherwise not possible. Nevertheless, we might 
question whether the influence this has on our social and individual reality is strictly positive. 
Standardization, on the one hand, also has undeniable benefits for the advancement and costs of 
knowledge. On the other hand, it disincentivizes the adaption of other conceptions of 
phenomena, restricts our understanding of them, and gradually establishes a definite 
interpretation in our daily experience through the expansion of data and data technologies. 
There remains much work to be completed. What we have done so far is neither definite 
nor exhaustive. Instead, we sketched one possible conception of statistical data in a manner that 
can only be exploratory. More than anything, our goal is to illustrate that such an explicit 
treatment of the fundamental properties of data can be of value for debates about data ethics and 
beyond. We also hope to motivate further research into how conceptions of data differ amongst 
disciplines and from information in general, as well as how they relate to ethical and social 
concerns raised. Not only concerns about specific kinds of algorithms should entertain our 
interests. The ways in which a data-driven society changes our perception of and place in the 
world, though more subtle, are by no means less decisive. For this reason, we must make an 
effort to better understand the characteristics of data.  
4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we provided one possible definition of data and showed how we can put it 
to work. In the first section, we defined a datum as the coming-together of substantive and 
numerical properties and differentiated between qualitative and quantitative data. We qualified 
this definition by arguing that data is only useful for statistics if commensurable in a manner that 
reveals meaningful differences that allow for the generation of relevant insights through 
statistical methodologies. In the second section, we focused on what our conception of data can 
contribute to the discourse on data ethics and beyond. First, we held that the need for useful data 
to be commensurable rules out an understanding of substantive properties as fundamentally 
unique or fundamentally equal. Instead, useful data must be defined at a level of generality 
between the two extremes. Second, we argued that practical concerns lead us to increasingly 
standardize how we operationalize a substantive property; in other words, how we formalize the 
relationship between the substantive and numerical properties of data. Thereby, we also 
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standardize the interpretation of a property. With our increasing reliance on data and data 
technologies, these two characteristics affect our conception of reality. Statistical data's exclusion 
of the fundamentally unique and equal influences our perspective on the world and the 
standardization of substantive properties can be viewed as profound ontological practice, 
entrenching ever more pervasive interpretations of phenomena in our everyday lives. However, 
more than anything, our goal is to demonstrate why we need an intensified debate about what 
exactly data is. If our collective and individual activities and reality become increasingly data-
driven, we should talk about what it is we are driven by.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
5 References 
Agresti, A., & Franklin, C. (2009). Statistics: The Art and Science of Learning from Data. 
Bandyopadhyay, P. S., & Forster, M. R. (2011). Philosophy of Statistics: An Introduction. In 
Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier Science & Technology. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/duke/detail.action?docID=713614 
Carson, J. (2007). American Psychology and the Seductions of IQ. In The Measure of Merit (pp. 
159–194). Princeton University Press; JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv346qgf.10 
Cukier, K. N., & Mayer-Schoenberger, V. (2019, September 17). The Rise of Big Data. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-04-03/rise-big-data 
Espeland, W. N., & Stevens, M. L. (2008). A Sociology of Quantification*. European Journal of 
Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 49(3), 401–436. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975609000150 
Floridi, L. (2011). Semantic information and the veridicality thesis. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232383.001.0001/a
cprof-9780199232383-chapter-4 
Floridi, L., & Taddeo, M. (2016). What is data ethics? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, 374(2083), 20160360. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2016.0360 
Freund, J. E., & Miller, I. (1965). Probability and statistics for engineers. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., Prentice-Hall [1965]. https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE001604840 
Jevons, W. S. (1874). The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method. 
Macmillan. 
12 
 
Leonelli, S. (2015). What Counts as Scientific Data? A Relational Framework. Philosophy of 
Science, 82(5), 810–821. 
Leonelli, S. (2016). The Philosophy of Data. In L. Floridi (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of 
Philosophy of Information (1 edition). Routledge. 
Liang, F., Das, V., Kostyuk, N., & Hussain, M. M. (2018). Constructing a Data-Driven Society: 
China's Social Credit System as a State Surveillance Infrastructure. Policy & Internet, 
10(4), 415–453. https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.183 
Mittelstadt, B. D., Allo, P., Taddeo, M., & Wachter, S. (2016). The ethics of algorithms: 
Mapping the debate. Big Data & Society, 3(2). 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951716679679 
Rajan, R. S. (2019, March 10). This is How AI is Redefining Love. Medium. 
https://medium.com/swlh/this-is-how-ai-is-redefining-love-53c78f0f1118 
Royal Society. (2012). Science as an open enterprise. https://royalsociety.org/-
/media/policy/projects/sape/2012-06-20-saoe.pdf 
Savage, L. J. (1977). The shifting foundations of statistics. In Logic, laws, & life: Some 
philosophical complications (pp. 3–18). Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh Press. 
https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE000223500 
The Economist. (2017). The world's most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data. The 
Economist. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-
resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data 
 
 
 
 
 
